Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 3

4-1-2008

Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in
the United States and the People's Republic of China
Jennifer A. Crane

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States and
the People's Republic of China, 7 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 95 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol7/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Copyright © 2008, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

RIDING THE TIGER:
A COMPARISON OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Jennifer A. Crane ∗
Introduction
“Doing business in China can unsettle seasoned lawyers,” warns Hong Kong
commercial attorney Kim Newby.1 Nowhere else is this statement more immediate than
in the realm of intellectual property law. The People’s Republic of China, hereinafter
referred to as China, offers a tempting yet mysterious market for many businesses and
investors of the Western hemisphere. China, home to 1.3 billion people,2 operates under a
communist system and is a world leader in advancing technology while retaining much of
its traditional culture. To Western nations, China’s legal, economic, and cultural
functioning remains a nearly inaccessible enigma. Yet Western economies increasingly
participate in the global market. Tremendous international pressure and the proverbial
“dangling carrot” of untapped foreign markets enticed China to acquiesce and join trade
agreements with the United States and Europe. Equitable tariff provisions aside, the most
prominent terms of these agreements center on securing and enforcing intellectual
property rights. China’s modern intellectual property system exists not to satisfy a
domestic demand for such rights, but to reflect the country’s concessions to Western
pressures in trade negotiations. Rather than create a system that reconciles Chinese
culture and jurisprudence with the various trade agreements, the national government in
Beijing simply adopted very Western-inspired intellectual property rights definitions and
institutions. This adopted system, by design or error, lacks the support in Chinese
provincial governments necessary to produce truly adequate intellectual property rights
enforcement.
The Beijing government began creating its Western-inspired intellectual property
rights system in the 1980s, yet today many U.S. businesses still remain apprehensive to
transfer technology to China. Critics openly question the effectiveness of actual
enforcement procedures. Now, over twenty years later, U.S. intellectual property
attorneys caution that if U.S. businesses export “proprietary technology [to China] that
can be misappropriated, expect it to be misappropriated.”3 Joseph Massey, a U.S. Trade
Representative, echoed the same concern in 2006, stating that “U.S. firms say that the
biggest problems they face in China today are much the same as the complaints they
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raised in 1986, namely inadequate protection or enforcement of [intellectual property
rights].”4 This ineffective enforcement caused some critics to argue that “China's current
system of intellectual property protection is more of a wish list for foreign investors than
a realistic and effective system of enforceable rules.”5 Such sentiment is so oft “repeated .
. . and expressed at any context where enforcement of [intellectual property rights] is
discussed that it has become a cliché.”6
When intellectual property rights develop organically, it reflects the needs and
understandings of a nation’s citizenry. A society must produce two prerequisite
understandings for intellectual property laws to develop: first, there must be “a clear
understanding that the invention or idea could indeed be a product of the human intellect
rather than a random gift of the gods,” and second, a society must recognize “the value of
the intellect in intangible form could also have commercial value.”7 While the ancient
Greeks and Romans acknowledged the former, it was not until the advent of craft guilds
of the Middle Ages that societies developed “proprietary attitudes towards [technical]
knowledge.”8 China’s history also suggests an ancient basis in certain limited types of
intellectual property rights, namely trademarks.9 Western intellectual property protection
grew from a nation’s specific desire to protect its citizens’ creative works and to
encourage further innovation.10 At English common law, and the U.S. jurisprudence that
subsequently borrowed heavily from it, intellectual property rights encouraged creative
production through economic incentive.11 And, as evidenced by the progression of the
U.S. system, the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights cannot occur until
both the population and the government value these rights. Modern copyright, patent, and
trademark law developed in Western societies as various economic and political factors
created a demand for intangible property rights in creative expression, innovation, and
customer goodwill.
For China, however, the situation is reversed. No internal stimuli prompted the
creation of an intellectual property system. Rather, China accelerated the modernization
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of its intellectual property laws to conform to the contemporaneous international
standards12 and created “an elaborate United States-inspired intellectual property legal
regime without the political and social foundations” to effect adequate enforcement.13
China’s motivation for implementing intellectual property laws was to gain favorable
trading partnerships with Western countries through various international agreements.14
The Beijing government’s formal enactment of treaty requirements allows the
government to create a system of plausible deniability; China can reap the benefits of the
agreements while handing enforcement responsibilities to provincial governments hostile
to intellectual property rights. This system provides protection for domestic infringers
and an alibi for the government in Beijing.
Chinese culture, isolated from Western societies for much of its development,
remains at odds with monopolistic and exclusionary property rights for innovations,
instead maintaining that knowledge is to be shared. It is abundantly clear why most of the
Chinese population see little use for protection of intellectual property rights; the sixty
year-old communist regime that denies property rights and subjugates the individual for
the sake of the community combined with the cultural disdain for proprietary knowledge
creates an environment hostile to intangible property rights in creative expressions and
innovations.
Despite differences in the impetus to develop intellectual property protections,
similarities exist between the early U.S. system and current Chinese system. While
externally stimulated, the evolution of China’s intellectual property laws mimics the U.S.
system’s early progression, from nearly powerless to moderately adequate. In its infancy,
the United States maintained policies that encouraged piracy of invention and expression
to bolster its own economy. The United States became an impartial defender of
intellectual property rights only after it became an economic powerhouse when
international protection was in its best interest. Regardless of the motivation, as the
United States and China’s progress plainly demonstrates, nations cease to be pirates and
become protectors only after the protection of intellectual property rights becomes
paramount to a national economy.
This paper will explore the development of the United States’ intellectual property
rights system and China’s underlying cultural resistance, furthered by the current
communist regime, to the granting and protecting of intellectual property rights. Next, I
shall seek to investigate the international pressures that influenced China’s present
intellectual property rights system as well as the operation of current Chinese intellectual
property rights protection. Finally, this effort will compare the functioning of early
American intellectual property protection with the modern Chinese system to provide
insight as to if and when China will effectively enforce intellectual property rights
domestically.
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I. A Historical and Political Analysis of
Intellectual Property in the United States
The intellectual property system of the United States was not created in a vacuum.
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution were well aware of English common law and
borrowed heavily from its understanding of limited monopolies and exclusive rights for
innovations and creative expressions. English common law developed from the English
application of ancient jurisprudential doctrines. An understanding of the United States’
system of intellectual property rights protection requires first an exploration of the
development copyright, patent and trademark protection in Europe and at English
common law. The United States intellectual property regime evolved from the very basic
and limited English system as the country’s and citizens’ needs required greater
sophistication and international equality.
A. Influences on United States Intellectual Property Rights
Throughout the Middle Ages (1250-1450 A.D.), human knowledge was considered
communal.15 Quotation marks appearing in the limited written works at the time signaled
wise passages; these grammatical marks were not yet used to alert readers to words that
were not the author’s own.16 Initially, quotations were considered “proverbs in the public
domain” and the only control available to an author was through the actual, physical copy
in his possession—once the manuscript or book left his clutch, “others were free to copy
it.”17 According to legend, the first European recognition of a literary property right
occurred in 567 A.D. in Ireland, when the ecclesiast Columba copied the psalter written by
his teacher Finnian.18 This intellectual theft led to a violent battle prior to the provincial
king hearing Finnian’s case. The king ruled in Finnian’s favor with the verdict “to every
cow her calf.”19 With this pithy phrase, the king acknowledged that the author possessed
some ownership interest.20 While Finnian’s king recognized authors’ intellectual property
rights, the English legal system remained less sophisticated and would take centuries
before formally recognizing literary property rights—even longer to acknowledge that
authors possessed them.
The idea of exclusive control over human creative expressions developed from the
English Crown’s desire to restrain unwanted writings. After the creation of the Church of
England, the King of England was not only the political authority, but the religious one as
well. As publishing technology advanced, the Crown, the English government and the
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Church of England floundered trying to control dissenting or blasphemous publications.21
The King began issuing Letters of Patent (“Printing Patents”), or open letters affixed with
his royal seal, to publishers, granting them exclusive rights to print certain works.22 In
1557 the Star Chamber, the high equity court, issued a Charter to the Stationer’s
Company. This document granted “[a] guild of publishers various powers intended to be
exerted against seditious and heretical books,”23 on the condition that the publishers agree
to “royal censorship, supervision, regulation and licensing of books.”24 The power of the
publishers’ guild continued to grow, each publisher retaining exclusive rights to publish
and reprint works in their catalogue. From these Letters of Patent and the Charter
developed the common law understanding of exclusive rights over written expressions.
Noticeably absent from this scheme was concern for authors’ rights.
In 1710, the English Parliament legislated on copyright protection, enacting the
Statute of Anne. For the first time, the statute gave authors of new works henceforth the
exclusive right to produce their works.25 Authors had control over their writings for a
fourteen-year period, with the option to renew for fourteen more.26 In 1769, the English
legal system handed down a seminal decision in Millar v. Taylor, holding that authors had
real common law property rights in their works.27 At the end of the eighteenth century,
“quotation marks [began] to signify the ‘property’ of the original author” as ideas about
property ownership and knowledge evolved.28
A number of factors encouraged this evolution of legal protections—utilitarian
and economic considerations to encourage works for the benefit of the whole community
and moral considerations, epitomized by John Locke’s theory of property.29 In his theory
of property, found in Treatise on Government, Locke maintained that property rights are
created when man mixes his labor with nature. Absent from Locke’s discussion of
property rights is any explicit reference to copyright, however his philosophy can be
expanded to include such rights; since “authors invest their labor in their work,” and
therefore should “have a moral right to control the expression they create.”30 By granting
exclusive control to authors, authors are motivated to produce creative works in order to
reap the subsequent rewards. By limiting the time period of this control, the new
knowledge benefits the entire community.

21
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The idea of a state-granted right to inventors over their creations originated in
Venice, Italy, during the fifteenth century and spread rapidly throughout Europe.31
Around the same time, England’s King Henry VI gave the Flemish glassmaker John of
Utyman a Letter of Patent granting him a twenty-year monopoly on his glass-making
process after Utyman’s installation of windows at Eton College.32 Nevertheless, the
English common law continued to refrain from granting vested ownership rights for
inventions because of the resistance to condone monopolies. The English Crown would,
from time to time, grant Letters of Patent, giving the inventor a “limited-term monopoly
privilege to engage in a new trade or craft” but there was no jurisprudential basis for it.33
It was from this privilege that the American founders extrapolated intellectual property
rights for an inventor. A true English patent practice, as understood in modernity, did not
develop prior to the 1800s.34
The idea of a state-granted right to inventors over their creations originated in
Venice, Italy, during the fifteenth century and spread rapidly throughout Europe.35
Around the same time, England’s King Henry VI gave the Flemish glassmaker John of
Utyman a Letter of Patent granting him a twenty-year monopoly on his glass-making
process after Utyman’s installation of windows at Eton College.36 Nevertheless, the
English common law continued to refrain from granting vested ownership rights for
inventions because of the resistance to condone monopolies. The English Crown would,
from time to time, grant Letters of Patent, giving the inventor a “limited-term monopoly
privilege to engage in a new trade or craft” but there was no jurisprudential basis for it.37
It was from this privilege that the American founders extrapolated intellectual property
rights for an inventor. A true English patent practice, as understood in modernity, did not
develop prior to the 1800s.38
The first trademarks appeared in the West to distinguish products and
manufacturers when commerce grew from intra-village trading to multi-regional and
national exchange.39 These marks developed as early as Greek and Roman times.40 The
first intellectual property rights arguably developed from the distinguishing marks on
products that derived value from customer goodwill. One of the first English forays into
intellectual property positive law had roots in the need for distinctive marks for consumer
confidence.41 An 1266 A.D. statute mandated “every baker shall have a mark of his own
for each sort of bread in order that would-be customers should know what kind of bread
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they were being offered” as a means to distinguish the quality of the product.42 While
trademarks are now included under the intellectual property rights umbrella, until the late
1800s they were considered to be the subject of commercial regulations law and as such,
no ownership property rights were recognized.
The framers of the Constitution, familiar with the limited patent, copyright, and
trademark privilege system of England, altered the English practice to better reflect the
new nation’s pioneering spirit. The English common law gave the framers a solid
foundation, but the framers were intent on creating an inventive and unique political
structure. The development of the U.S. intellectual property rights system reflected the
English common law as well as the innovative attitude and economic needs of the new
country.
B. America: “The Pirate”
Stemming from an English common law background of authors’ copyright and
Letters of Patent privileges, the U.S. Constitution included a provision for the promotion
of the “Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”43 The Intellectual
Property Clause, as it is now known, was presented at the 1785 Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia shortly before it adjourned and was unanimously approved,
astonishingly, with little to no debate.44 This lack of discussion carried through the
ratification process. Scholar Marci Hamilton suggests that from this “scant debate” and
the literal text, “the Framers believed the progress of knowledge was in the national
interest,” and they were willing to suppress copying and imitation for limited periods so
that technology and expression “would progress and the community would benefit.”45
Interesting to note, this enumerated power of the U.S. Congress to “Promote the
Sciences and useful Arts” is contained in the only clause that also articulates a specific
mode of effecting that power.46 As well, the Clause contains limits to this power, namely
that the right be granted for a “limited” time, “exclusively” to the author or inventor, and
that the innovation must advance “Science and the useful Arts.”47 So ingrained in the
American psyche is this desire to encourage a broad range of innovation through capital
benefit, the U.S. Supreme Court has never felt compelled to “render an opinion as to the
meaning of either ‘science’ or ‘useful arts’ as used.”48 The accepted definition of
“Science,” as understood in the eighteenth century by the framers, is generally
“knowledge” or “learning” while the “useful Arts” means simply “helpful or valuable
trades.”49 The framers included the Intellectual Property Clause not only to ensure

42
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limitation of the incentive-monopolies for invention and creativity, but also to encourage
innovation in all aspects of knowledge and industry.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution drew just as heavily from the English
common law practice of granting Letters of Patent and copyright protections as from the
English repugnance for monopolies when establishing the Intellectual Property Clause. In
English practice, Letters of Patents and copyrights were considered privileges from the
Crown rather than a right springing from and vested in a creative work.50 The English
practice exempted holders of Letters of Patents and copyrights from the prohibition of
monopolies and did not encourage innovation so much as merging of power for the
artisans or publishers in the Crown’s favor. The U.S. Constitution’s Intellectual Property
Clause functions to separate monopolist forces, “correspondingly weakening them to the
benefit of the people.”51 The existence of the Intellectual Property Clause indicates the
importance of intellectual property rights to the framers, who were uncertain if the U.S.
Congress would have the power to recognize property rights of inventors and authors
without an explicit grant of authority. In order to restrict monopolies and incentivize
innovation and creative expression, they not only stated the specific power but the mode
in which it was to be effected.
Yet the United States was not always the beacon of intellectual property law
honesty that it presents itself as today. The early history of American intellectual property
abounds with tales of piracy, theft, imitation, and deceit. In his first State of the Union
address, George Washington spoke of his concerns about the future of the U.S. economy
and called on Congress to create legislation not only to encourage domestic innovation,
but also for “the introduction of new inventions from abroad.”52 During Thomas
Jefferson’s presidency, then Secretary of State Alexander Hamilton put together a report
outlining a plan to become Europe’s economic rival.53 Hamilton wanted to impose stiff
tariffs on imported European goods and to use the “tariff wall” protection to foster a
robust domestic patent system.54 Key to Hamilton’s plan was the immigration of skilled
foreign workers to the young nation. He effectively sent forth the message to immigrants
to “bring your nation’s industrial secrets to America.”55
The early U.S. copyright laws and policies actually encouraged piracy of foreign
literary works. Domestic copyright protection was greatly valued by the United States, as
evidenced by twelve of the thirteen original colonies enacting their own copyright
legislation before adopting the federal Constitution.56 While the Copyright Act of 1790
prohibited copying works by U.S. authors, it supported the piracy of foreign works by not
recognizing foreign copyrights and prohibiting non-citizens from registering a U.S.
copyright. As the United States attempted to create its own artistic culture, Americans
50
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“wanted foreign copyrighted works on the cheap.”57 At one point, Charles Dickens’ novel
A Christmas Carol sold in Great Britain for the equivalent of $2.50, while a copy could
be purchased in the United States for about $0.06.58 The piracy of foreign copyrights
continued in the United States until 1891 when the U.S. Congress passed legislation
allowing copyright relations with other countries.59 However, U.S. protection of Englishlanguage literary works only extended to works manufactured domestically until 1986
when the amendment to the copyright act lapsed.60
U.S. patent legislation chronologically coincided with copyright legislation. The
laws enacting the early patent protections enabled infringement of domestic and
international inventions alike. The first Patent Act in the United States was enacted in
1790.61 The original Patent Act required inventors to submit petitions directly to the
Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson.62 The Secretary of State, together with the
Secretary of War and the Attorney General, reviewed all patent petitions, but the number
of petitions quickly became burdensome.63 In three years (1790-1793), 57 U.S. patents
were granted, 114 petitions were still pending, and dozens of petitions were denied.64 The
Patent Act of 1793 attempted to correct the system by doing away with a review of each
petition.65 Rather, an inventor simply needed to register his invention with the U.S.
Department of State.66 As could be expected, this led to multiple patenting of the same
invention.67 Some of this duplication was innocent when separate inventors unknowingly
registered the same inventions. Other times, this duplication was far more fraudulent.68
Each patent petition was a matter of public record. A person could view the record at the
Department of State’s record room, steal whatever idea he thought profitable, and register
it again as his own.69 Another loophole of the 1793 Act lay in the fact that only American
citizens were eligible for a U.S. patent, enabling an American businessman to “bring a
foreign innovation to the United States and commercialize the idea, all with total legal
immunity” and even government support.70 The U.S. Congress amended the Act in 1800
to allow foreign citizens who resided in the United States for two years to petition for a
patent; in 1832, the Act was revised to enable foreigner citizens who lived in the United
States for twelve months and who swore an oath of intention for U.S. citizenship to

57
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petition.71 The substance of the Patent Act remained authoritative until 1836 and enabled
American entrepreneurs to steal some of Europe’s most profitable trade secrets and
technologies, becoming “by national policy and legislative act, the world’s premier legal
sanctuary for industrial pirates.”72
One famous example of this piracy involves the U.S. citizen Francis Cabot
Lowell. In 1810, Lowell set out to steal the Cartwright loom—an invention that allowed
England to become the world leader in textiles. So vital was this technology that England
“forbade the export of the machinery, the making or selling of drawings of the equipment
and the emigration of the skilled workers.”73 Lowell visited England under the guise of
traveling for health reasons—the cold damp air could somehow aid his constitution.
Those he met were taken with the Harvard graduate’s charm and credentials. Eager to
show off their innovative devices, which they guarded jealously from each other, British
textile producers gave Lowell guided and detailed tours of their factories. Unbeknownst
to his hosts, Lowell possessed an almost photographic memory and recorded everything
he saw and heard each night in his journals. Despite the fact his belongings were futilely
searched twice before he departed for home, Lowell smuggled the plans for the
Cartwright loom out of England and recreated them in his own factory. Lowell created
the Boston Manufacturing Company with his stolen technology and encouraged
politicians to increase import tariffs, thus successfully pushing England’s cloth out of the
American market.74 Lowell’s story is by no means unique. Not until the U.S. economy
achieved a certain robustness and U.S. citizens sought recognition of their intellectual
property rights abroad did the United States truly install effective protection of
international intellectual property.
The U.S. system of intellectual property rights requires intellectual property
owners to maintain watch over their own rights. Copyrights and patents may be granted,
and trademarks and trade secrets recognized, but in order for intellectual property to have
any value in the United States, individuals and businesses must police the related industry
and use the U.S. legal system to enforce their rights. America employs a structure that
relies on an individual safeguarding his rights through litigation. The grants of exclusive
rights for intellectual property are, therefore, worthless unless an owner remains vigilant
in the policing of potential infringers. Adequate protection is only possible with a
responsive judicial system and investigative and protective rights-holders.
II. An Historical and Political Analysis of Intellectual Property
in the People’s Republic of China
It is easy to possess a mistaken impression that the culture and politics of China,
both in antiquity and modernity, predisposes Chinese society to lack any recognition of
intellectual property. However, like the early evolution of English common law

71
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74
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72
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trademarks, a Chinese system developed to mark and distinguish products made by
individual producers. Archaic trademark laws demonstrate that Chinese culture is not
entirely adverse to intellectual property. However, the social, philosophical and
governmental beliefs of China were adverse to the concepts of copyright and patent.
Trademarks were used in ancient China. Ke Shao, a scholar at the Queen Mary
Intellectual Property Research Institute at the University of London, found that from the
seventh century A.D. in China, the “[u]ses of trademarks [were] said to be regulated by
laws, which both guaranteed the quality control and boosted the consciousness of rights”
of manufacturers.75 As technology advanced and travel and trading became easier in the
sixteenth century, consumers began using marks on products to discriminate between
goods and value attached to the unique marks.76 Evidence exists of a pharmacy that was
required to change its name as it shared a Chinese character (letter) with the new
emperor.77 Upon the emperor’s death, the pharmacy reverted back to its original name
suggesting that “there must have something of great value behind trademark,” most likely
“[t]he individual goodwill that directly relates to customers and market.”78 Early
trademark laws carried severe punishments: an administrative law of the Tang
bureaucracy, from 618-907 A.D., mandated that “false and confused products will be
confiscated” while the Tang penal code declared “anyone who falsely makes and sells
disqualified utensils, appliances, silk and cloths will be flogged sixty strokes.”79
Copyright and patent laws, however, never developed in Chinese antiquity. The
main impediment to Chinese copyright laws comes from a history of strong paternalistic
government and Confucianism and Taoism influences. The traditional Chinese ideals of
proper self-interest, Li, and personal relationships, Guanxi, may “trump… natural rights”
and an understanding of personal property.80 In Chinese culture, the complementary
concepts of Li and Fa play into the Chinese understanding of personal rights. Li
predisposes individuals to “be submerged in the collective” and Fa enables the state to
control the individual. The Chinese term for ‘rights’, Quanli, holds itself at odds with the
concept of intellectual property. Quan means “to weigh or balance” while Li connotes
proper self-interest within the community.”81 In fact, the whole concept of Li, if properly
followed, “should lead one away from activity that promotes dissension and toward social
harmony.”82 Therefore, the etymology of Quanli “literally implies a weighing or
balancing of interests”83 and ultimately “leave[s] the Chinese people predisposed against
the concept of intellectual property rights.”84 Li and Quanli prefer a reliance on
customary interaction and a reticence to apply positive law.
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The cultural importance of the interpersonal relationship in China is also of
significance. Guanxi is a Chinese idea of “social connections” and “complex networking
of relationships… based on mutual obligation, reciprocity, goodwill and personal
affection.”85 The fostering and development of stable, useful personal relationships, and
not individual rights, is paramount to the Chinese cultural and political structure. Guanxi
tempers the rule of law. Confucian philosophy teaches “the rule of law becomes
necessary only when individuals wish to act outside their assigned roles.”86 Therefore, if
Guanxi functions properly, there is no need for laws. An equally influential philosophy,
Taoism, holds a similar contempt for positive law, for only when a person has “lost the
Way, [of] ‘integrity, humaneness, righteousness and etiquette’ does disorder develop”
which necessitates the development of law.87
In addition to Chinese philosophy and elevation of the community over the
individual, the cultural understanding of the role of information and knowledge in China
hinders the development of a legal intellectual property rights system. While the history
of trademarks demonstrates that a value is placed on who made a product, there is little
appreciation for who invented it. The Chinese culture does not view the “imitation or
copying of works of other people…as illegitimate, or even questionable.”88 The
intangible innovation has no real economic value as “the Chinese traditionally feel they
should only pay for the tangible goods,” and as such should be shared to improve the
community’s knowledge.89
The Confucian and Taoist philosophic and cultural influences of Li, Fa, Quanli,
and Guanxi culminate and are exhibited in the Chinese Communist Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause. Article 51 of the Chinese Constitution states “the exercise by
citizens…of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of
society and of the collective.”90 This government mandate combined with the explicit
veneration of the community to the cultural subjugation of the individual and the reliance
on custom rather than law makes it apparent why acceptance of intellectual property
rights becomes a seemingly impossible feat.
After a long, isolated and imperial history, China emerged on the international
stage in the nineteenth century. Throughout World War I and World War II, China was in
a state of turmoil, filled with internal revolutions and unrest as the country struggled to
create a modern identity for itself. During one uprising by the Communist Party in China,
Mao Tse Tung gained leadership and took control of China after the Long March and the
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Second Sino-Japanese War in 1949. In 1966, Mao began the official campaign known as
the Cultural Revolution to re-educate the Chinese people and incorporate communism
into all aspects of their lives. Today, the Communist Party controls China, though the
government has moved to a decentralized, provincial structure.
The Communist Party in China does not consider a socialist legal and political
system as an end itself, but rather as a “basis for the government’s efforts at political and
economic reforms.”91 The post-Mao government created a unique and “precarious
interdependency between legal culture and political legitimacy” as the central
government in Beijing delegated more authority and control to the various provinces.92
The Communist government relies on the believed and respected political philosophy
adhered to by the Chinese people to enforce its laws. With a loosened national grip, the
Communist party relies on the continued conviction and subsequent action of the
population for its sustained power.
This decentralized government creates problems for international treaty
enforcement. The structure has led to local officials gaining expansive and often
unchecked powers, aptly employing a Chinese adage, “the mountains [are] high and the
emperor in Beijing [is] far away.”93 The Beijing government effectively has little control
over the provincial powers, while the Communist party and local interest still appear to
dominate local politics and policy. While this arrangement remains frustrating to Western
businesses and politicians who would like a responsible and accountable body for
entering international agreements, China is able to let the Beijing government formally
assent to trade treaties, while enabling provinces to independently proceed with more
locally motivated agendas on intellectual property protection.
During the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party of China undermined the
judiciary and therefore, the ability to effectively enforce intellectual property laws. The
Party villainized judges as “enemies” of the new order and forced them into the
countryside to be “reeducated,” severely reducing the number of courts available.94 In the
1980s, the Beijing government recognized the skeleton legal system was grossly
inadequate and has since restored courts and judges during the past twenty years.95
Nevertheless, while the judges’ ranks expand, they still do not possess “the competence
or respect…to carry the type of clout they need to effectively enforce judgments.”96 The
reeducation of former judges and reordering of the judicial system demonstrated the
Communist Party’s power, effectively creating puppet judges. The current judiciary, “as
with all significant organs of the Chinese government, is still subject to the supervision of
the Chinese Communist Party.”97 Even if judges wished to enforce international treaty
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provisions, pressure from the Party or local businessmen might make enforcing and/or
even rendering such enforcement impossible.
The Chinese interdependency between political culture and legal legitimacy is
most obvious in the example of provincial courts. As these courts rely on the local
Communist-controlled government for resources and judicial appointments, judges are
beholden to local politicians. The Adjudication Committee of the Communist Party in a
province may “direct a particular ‘verdict’” if sensitive or significant political matters are
in dispute.98 The local officials of the Communist Party effectively use the provincial
courts as a vehicle to effectuate their own agendas. In the absence of democratic or public
feedback-sensitive organizations, local Chinese governments “wager[] [their] legitimacy
on the success of [their] economic and legal reforms” which require a compliant
judiciary.99
China created a federal judiciary with various appellate branches to accommodate
the decentralized government. Each province has various Basic People’s Courts, an
Intermediate People’s Court and a Higher People’s Court. The highest Chinese court is
the national Supreme People’s Court. Three-judge panels announce their decisions by
way of written brief, which have been criticized as lacking “analysis or legal
reasoning.”100
Due to international pressure to create an independent judiciary, the Beijing
government implemented its first five-year plan in 1999. The goals of the 1999 plan
included improving judiciary education, increasing the number of judges, enforcing anticorruption regulations, adopting a more adversarial system in court proceedings, and
improving the efficiency of the courts.101 The second five-year plan, enacted in 2004 and
still ongoing, stresses the need to make the courts financially independent, establish a
case-law precedent system and coordinate a consistent understanding of the laws
throughout China’s provinces.102 While these formal acquiescences serve to placate
international fears, it remains unclear if the Beijing government has the ability or even the
desire to effect these improvements. The extremely decentralized government may enable
Beijing to formally agree to one thing, while the provincial governments continue to act
in contrary and self-interested ways.
III. International Pressures and Agreements
When China emerged from isolation in the nineteenth century, international forces
rushed to create spheres of influence on the heavily populated nation. The United States,
upon seeing other European and Asian nations struggling to gain exclusive footholds on
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Chinese soil, negotiated the famous Open Door Policy in 1900.103 To retain the integrity
of China as a nation, the Open Door Policy mandated free use of certain seaports and a
respect for each nation’s claimed territory. During World War II, the United States sent
aid to China to fight Japan. When the Communist Party gained control in 1949 and
established the People’s Republic of China, the United States refused to recognize the
newly constituted nation, instead continuing relations with the democratic Republic of
China (Taiwan) as the legitimate government of China. Not until 1970 did the United
States attempt to reconnect with China. In 1972, President Richard Nixon visited China
and the two nations released the Shanghai Communiqué, expressing both countries’
desire to establish normal trade relations. Since then, the United States has exerted
influence by means of trade pressures to motivate the Chinese government to give weight
to the rule of law. The United States imposed economic sanctions in reaction to incidents
such as those in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and repressed other trade programs and
incentives to persuade China to comply with international intellectual property
agreements.104
Under pressure from the United States and other nations, China agreed to most
major international intellectual property treaties in the 1980s and 1990s. China’s
intellectual property rights system was enacted solely to comply with various treaty
provisions—most of the Chinese intellectual property definitions and institutions imitate
both the U.S. and European systems.
China’s attempted inclusion and eventual accession into the WTO is the driving
force behind much of its intellectual property legislation and enforcement during the
1990s. The WTO administers and enforces TRIPs along with other trade agreements and
China must be in full compliance with its requirements by 2011 to remain a part of the
organization. As China seeks to benefit economically from good standing in international
trade relations, it has, at least superficially, attempted to implement the intellectual
property standards required by the WTO.
IV. The Modern Chinese Intellectual Property Rights System
The Chinese government possesses a short and turbulent history with positive
intellectual property law. After the Communist revolution in 1949, all former laws were
eradicated and China remained without any sort of intellectual property protection until
1982.105 The National People’s Congress passed the 1982 Trademark Law followed by
the 1985 Administrative Regulations on Technology-Introduction Contracts.106 These
regulations required inventors, businesses, and foreign investors to register contracts for
technology transfers and associated intellectual property rights with the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, or relevant local authorities, for
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approval.107 The government determined whether technology covered by technology or
intellectual property rights transfer contracts was “suitable” for a project, was of an
“advanced nature,”108 and did not contradict Communist constitutional ideals.109 Yet these
contracts could not exceed ten years in length.110 Through the 1980s in China, very few
intellectual property rights existed; the existing trademark and patent laws were weak and
routinely flaunted, and no copyright protection existed whatsoever.111 When international
pressure surrounding global trade issues came to the forefront, China began in earnest to
enact new intellectual property legislation.
Understanding China’s new intellectual property rights system requires a cursory
look at its 1999 Uniform Contract Laws (UCL) and their cultural foundation. The Beijing
government enacted the UCL to comply with WTO requirements; the aims of the UCL
included retreating from a state-planned economy by supporting economic and political
behavior to encourage a market-based system.112 The UCL attempted to relax some of the
rigid contract formalities and remove discrepancies in the former code.113 With legislation
in place to support a more Western and capitalist understanding of business, the Beijing
government began a move to provide regulations for intellectual property rights.
In 1992 and again in 2000 to 2001, China enacted rounds of amendments to
intellectual property rights laws with the passage of new copyright, patent, and trademark
laws.114 Between fifty and sixty percent of the laws pertaining to intellectual property
rights were updated.115 The 1992 revisions of the Patent Law brought China into further
compliance with TRIPs. The 2000 to 2001 legislation fully protected rights outlined in
the TRIPs agreement, including: a patentee’s rights for offering his invention for sale,
new judicial reviews for invention patents, the protection of utility models and industrial
designs, more efficient procedures for production and sale injunctions and further
restrictions on the government’s compulsory license capabilities.116 While these new
regulations are still not fully consistent with all international conventions agreed to by the
Beijing government, China is still currently within the time period to make full
adjustments.
A. Copyrights
The protection of copyright remains the intellectual property right in China with
the most dichotomies between the law and its enforcement. Thus far, the copyright
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legislation enacted by the Beijing government has “produced more bark than bite.”117 The
current national law protects “literary works, oral works, musical, operatic, dramatic and
acrobatic works, fine art, architectural works, photographic works, cinematographic
works . . . engineering drawings, design drawings, graphic works [and] computer
software,” among other creative compositions.118 Copyright holders possess the right to
restrict the “copying, publishing, exploiting, [or] broadcasting [of] a work,” and works
are protected for fifty years from publication or production.119 As per the TRIPs
agreement, formal registration of copyright is not required to obtain rights per se, but it is
necessary to initiate litigious disputes.120 Local provincial copyright officials handle
domestic copyright registration while the State Copyright Bureau coordinates foreign
registrations.121 It is unclear what protection exists for unpublished works.
The enforcement of copyrights in China remains inadequate by international
standards; a lack of structure to the enforcement system and seemingly no deterrent to
pirate-entrepreneurs fuels infringement activities. Currently, the enforcement of
copyrights is divided among five national administrative and government agencies that
guide provincial efforts.122 This system has been described as “arbitrary and nontransparent” with relatively low penalties.123 Liable copyright infringers may only be
required to pay damages up to proven lost profits, infringers’ gains, or reasonable
royalties (or ¥500,000 [around $65,000] if these are not easily assessed).124 No provisions
exist in the law for punitive damages for willful infringement or criminal charges.125 For
the few infringers actually found liable, this system provides little deterrence to pirates
who are sheltered by the overlapping bureaucracy of China’s enforcement mechanism.
B. Patents
The current Chinese patent law appropriates many patent regulations and
definitions from the U.S. system, leaving little consideration for China’s own unique
communal culture and creating a patent system rife with internal struggles. The Chinese
patent laws require that an invention, to be patentable, must be “novel, inventive and of
practical applicability.”126 The Chinese requirement bears similarity to the U.S.
requirements of usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness.127 China restricts the meaning
of “novel” slightly as compared to the U.S. definition; the Chinese use of the word
“means that no identical invention or utility model has been disclosed in China or
117
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anywhere in the world, or made known to the public in the country before filing.”128 The
U.S. definition of novelty only precludes patentability if the invention was known, used,
sold, or described in the U.S. or “patented or described in a printed publication in…a
foreign country” prior to the patentee’s application.129 China will also not grant a patent
for any invention that the examiners deem “against social morality, detrimental to the
public interest or contrary to the laws of the State.”130 A compulsory license allowing
government use may also be obtained in cases of national emergency,131 or in
“‘extraordinary’ state of affairs” or “‘when the public interest so requires.’”132 The
wording of the national patent law is such that any patent could be infringed at the will of
the government; yet it is important to note that while China has this power, it has yet to
command a compulsory license. 133 In contrast to the United States, but in accord with
Europe and most other countries, China follows a “first to file” system, granting a patent
to the first person to apply regardless of actual inventorship.134 Patents must be filed with
the State Intellectual Property Office, and the rights granted in a patent are negative
rights, allowing a patentee to exclude others so that no one else “may make, use or sell
the patented product, or use the patented process or use or sell the product of that process
without the patentee’s permission.”135 A patentee can also “prevent unauthorized imports”
of a patented invention into China.136 The requirements of patentability in modern
Chinese patent law seem to be wholly imported from the TRIPs agreement, while the
restrictions on patentability stem from Communist apprehension of an entirely free
market.
Patent infringement suits may be adjudicated in two ways in China—a patentee
can choose to take an infringement case to the People’s Courts or can go through an
administrative process.137 Businesses and individuals can seek injunctions and
preventative preservation measures as well as damages through the Chinese judicial
system.138 Calculations of compensation for infringement must be made “according to the
profits made by the infringer or the losses suffered,” which may include the litigation and
enforcement costs for stopping the infringement.139 As in copyrights, discretionary
damages may not exceed ¥ 500,000, or about $65,000.140 Article 57 of China’s Patent
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Law, as per TRIPs requirements, shifts the burden of proof to a defendant to prove that
infringement did not occur or that there was innocent ignorance of any infringement.141
The People’s Court, however, still requires substantial evidence to adequately plead a
complaint. Damages commanded by the Courts “tend to be very low”142 as well as
“vague and unimposing.”143 Businesses may also resolve their cases before the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), but this avenue of
resolution precludes any judicial action.144
C. Trademarks
Given the limited but pervasive history of trademarks in China, trademark
protection is a smaller pill for the Beijing government and Chinese people to swallow.
Entities must now register their trademarks with the State Administration of Industry and
Commerce (SAIC) on a “first to file” basis, with registration protecting the mark for ten
years and subsequent renewals available for additional ten-year periods.145 As in the U.S.
system, registered marks may be canceled for a variety reasons, including abandonment if
the mark has not been used for three consecutive years, fraudulent registration, or “nondistinctive[ness].”146, 147 In compliance with the TRIPs agreement, the 2001 Chinese
Trademark Law grants a judicial review of the SAIC’s decision to reject a trademark
application or cancellation of a registered mark as well as the confiscation of goods or
fines for infringement of a mark.148 The Chinese people more readily accept trademark
laws because of a culturally-recognized value determination. The national and provincial
governments more readily protect these intellectual property rights, as demonstrated by
the expansion of Chinese trademark legislation and public litigation of disputes. In fact,
the Beijing government seems more willing to give protection to domestic unregistered
trademarks and trade dress than registered foreign marks under the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law.149
Foreign marks not registered in China actually receive some limited protection.
Through various enactments since 2001, the Beijing government provides a system to
protect “well-known” marks.150 The four requirements of the “well-known” trademark
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protection regime are: (1) a “competent authority” to identify the mark;151 (2) a specific
procedure of identification;152 (3) explicit standards of identification; and (4) the actual
protection of the mark.153 The standards used to balance a “well-known” trademark’s
protection rights against a registered mark’s rights consist of a balancing of the extent of
the public’s knowledge of the “well-known” mark, the length of the “well-known” mark’s
use, the extent and geography of the “well-known” mark’s publicity, the protection record
of the “well-known” mark, and any other relevant factors.154
As China employs the “first to file” rule, the “well-known” mark protection
enables foreign businesses to safeguard their trademarks registered elsewhere from
bootleggers and squatters. As of 2001, the CIETAC has issued eight rulings on “wellknown” marks on the issue of Internet domain name registration rights.155 The CIETAC
ruled in favor of five foreign businesses, including IKEA, Proctor & Gamble, and
DuPont, allowing these companies to reclaim domain names such as ikea.com.cn and
dupont.com.cn based on the “spirit of the Paris Convention and Article 2 of the AntiUnfair Competition Laws.”156 However, this “spirit” is not universally adhered to in
China. In 2003, Geely, China’s largest domestic car manufacturer used Toyota’s logo
without permission on its Meiri sedan model and in its promotion materials.157 The
provincial Chinese court ruled that the logo, which Toyota used worldwide, “is not
recognized in China as a ‘distinctive brand.’”158 Not only did Toyota lose its case, it also
paid court costs for the suit.159 While China has made strides to comply with international
standards of trademark protection, such instances demonstrate that further progress is
required to allay foreign investors’ fears of rampant infringements.
D. Trade Secrets
Chinese culture holds a long tradition of passing down expertise and industrial
and commercial secrets within a family to continue a family business; the culture is more
accepting of granting legal protection to the intellectual property right of trade secrets.
The SAIC defines a trade secret as any technological or business information that “falls
outside the public domain and that can render economic benefits to the owner of
undisclosed information, ‘and for which the party that has rights therein has adopted
measures to maintain its confidentiality.’”160 Acquiring trade secrets is not a criminal
offense despite the criminal penalty “for obtaining private property by unlawful
means.”161 This distinction indicates that the Chinese government does not view a trade
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secret as property. However, any misappropriating party may be ordered to “desist from
the illegal act” and be fined between $1,200 and $25,000.162 Of all the intellectual
property rights, the Beijing government appears to most readily embrace trade secrets,
being “fiercely protective of their own secrets” as they too “are aware of the lack of
[intellectual property rights] enforcement.”163 The Chinese culture embraces trade secret
as the preferred method of keeping information and innovations confidential. The
strength of the modern trade secret protection comes from this cultural attitude and the
recognition that positive intellectual property rights are ineffective.
The requisite intellectual property laws are now in place for China to enforce
sufficiently rigorous intellectual property rights protection at an international standard
following the well-tread provisions of the Berne and Paris Conventions and the TRIPs
agreement. Since the Beijing government has formally assented to the requirements of
intellectual property treaties and the standards of the WTO to effect the country’s stature
in the global marketplace, the biggest obstacle to true protection is now in the
enforcement of the positive law.
V. Current Chinese Enforcement and Cultural Change
The weakest link in the modern Chinese intellectual property rights system
remains the enforcement of the country’s new laws and their adjudication by provincial
authorities. Historically, Chinese culture views litigation as a “failure of community and a
reflection of disharmony”; judicial resolution is not favored among the Chinese business
community.164 Even when cases are brought to judicial or bureaucratic authorities for
resolution, judges and officials may not remain as independent and unbiased as the
international community might hope. It is the “attitudes of the particular players” and
partiality of provincial judges to local interests which are integral to the effectiveness of
intellectual property rights enforcement.165 One judge went so far as to openly state on
the record, “Chinese intellectual property laws exist to protect Chinese intellectual
property” from the rest of the world.166 With attitudes such as this dominating the
provincial judiciaries, the current Chinese intellectual property rights system continues to
frustrate foreign interests.
Preferential treatment given to Chinese interests is evidenced throughout new
intellectual property rights legislation. The Chinese laws, in fact, identify and categorize
an entity by its ownership—whether it is a “wholly foreign-owned entity,” a joint venture,
or a company owned entirely by Chinese (a “domestic entity”).167 Each classification of
entity is subject to “specific requirements related to formation and operation.”168 In
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addition, Chinese entities themselves may be wholly or partially owned by the
government and is “nearly inseparable from the state” as a result of China’s Company
Law requirements, raising serious questions about a court’s ability to rule against such
companies.169 The existence of these categorizations, their formation requirements and
strong government influence indicate differential and partial treatment given to various
entities by judiciary and arbitration organizations. While China’s accession to the WTO
and the TRIPs agreement removed some of the disparate treatment, the independent
adjudication and enforcement of judicial decisions remain wanting.170
As previously noted, the Chinese courts’ and arbiters’ independence is often
critiqued by scholars and foreign investors.171 Conflicting decrees from various branches
of the Beijing government lead many provincial officials to develop “a habit of ignoring
government rules.”172 In 1979, Beijing authorities increased local governments’
legislative and executive authority.173 In the realm of intellectual property rights, the
effect was to give control to officials who “almost always prioritized keeping illegitimate
operations going” because of the benefit to the local economy.174 While the publicized
goal of this decentralization of government power was to “enhance local autonomy,” it
also “worsened China’s ability to fight piracy.”175 The impetus behind the blind eye local
officials’ turn on infringing practices may not always be corruption and bribery.
Infringing practices of Chinese businesses may be a valuable source of local revenue and
employment, making local authorities “reluctant or even resistant to the enforcement” of
intellectual property rights for fear of “antagonizing a local power structure” or impeding
the community’s income.176 In some instances, provincial officials and their local
priorities result in differing inter-province interpretations of the national laws.177 In
poorer provinces, a higher demand for counterfeit or pirated items often exists, and the
sale results in local prosperity and satisfaction of demand.178 Provincial officials choose
not to look beyond this net benefit, as strengthening the local economy is the “end-all
goal.”179 The decentralized government allows Beijing to commit the country to
international treaties while lacking the power to enforce the provisions.
Provincial Chinese authorities, taking comfort in the knowledge that the Beijing
government is “far away over the mountains,” employ many methods to deter foreign
lawsuits and to provide domestic benefits from lax intellectual property rights
enforcement.180 The provincial courts may openly rule against foreign businesses (e.g. the
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Toyota/Geely dispute and the loss of the distinctive Toyota trademark) or employ subtler
tools of prejudice to discourage foreign lawsuits.181 The current system mandates
plaintiffs notify potential defendants warning that litigation is being considered. The
Chinese judicial system requires gathering all evidence prior to filing a suit, so these
letters effectively give infringers forewarning, enabling them to “hide or destroy the
evidence.”182 Since China’s intellectual property rights laws were not culled from a
common law tradition but were imposed upon the country through a civil law system
after a long history of isolation, the few provincial court decisions in foreign businesses’
favor (e.g., IKEA, Proctor & Gamble, and DuPont) have no precedential value. 183
Foreign entrepreneurs hoping to preventatively protect their intellectual property
or to stop infringers are often left in the dark about how to proceed. China operates a
system of “internal, unpublished rules beneath the normal system of law” in which,
frequently, “the secret system trumps the published one.”184 These unpublished rules stem
from the prevalent Communist Party’s influence in the politics, judicial, and business
spheres and integrate the concepts of Li, Fa, Quanli, and Guanxi. This unwritten cultural
and judicial system is not an intentional frustration of justice, but rather exemplifies the
Chinese cultural tradition and national interests. Those Western businesses that have
managed to work within this unwritten system recognize the cultural importance of
Guanxi and expend the time and effort to build the requisite personal relationships that
are revered far more than positive law.
China’s intellectual property rights system is not without hopeful signs to the
international community, though improvements may prove to be superficial. Despite
obvious issues with enforcement, China continues to make progress in its very young
intellectual property law regime. Beginning in earnest in 1995 and 1996, China created a
functioning intellectual property rights system, with the enforcement of these rights being
a significant part of a nationwide anti-crime campaign.185 Between 1994 and 1998, the
Beijing government reported seizing 35 million illegal audio-visual products and 20
million smuggled VCDs (video formatted compact discs, similar to DVDs), while ending
operations or leveraging fines against 74 pirated VCD assembly businesses.186 In 2003,
Chinese officials reported sending out 150,000 enforcement agents to crack down on
counterfeit or infringing products.187 These agents confiscated almost thirteen million
pirated products and closed nearly 2,000 illegal businesses.188 While China touts these
statistics as improved enforcement, these numbers are miniscule when compared to
China’s size. A dramatic increase in enforcement would be necessary to raise public
awareness and to educate domestic businesses to intellectual property laws currently on
the books in China.
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While administrative and judicial processes remain largely shrouded in mystery to
most foreign investors, some agencies are attempting to clarify the process. The Ministry
of Trade and Economic Cooperation now publishes a legal gazette of trade rules and
regulations.189 While this publication does not adequately announce policy changes
regarding existing regulations, it does indicate the Beijing government’s willingness to
address some of the international community’s complaints. In cases involving foreign
parties, Chinese provincial courts have also released detailed legal analyses of decisions
to provide guidance, but not guarantees, for future litigation.190
Conclusion
It may be that strict enforcement of intellectual property rights cannot be expected
of an emerging economy, though China’s economic development is certainly retarded by
its traditional and communist opposition to personal property rights. The United States’
internal demands for global intellectual property protection were created by international
infringement on its citizens’ inventions and works. Since China is late in joining the
global marketplace, most of the major developed nations already maintain intellectual
property rights systems that adequately recognize and protect Chinese nationals’
intellectual property rights abroad. This recognition gives protection to Chinese business
seeking to use their intellectual property rights outside the mainland, thereby eliminating
the motivation to develop reciprocal domestic enforcement. In 2007, the United States
filed action against China at the WTO, charging a lack of enforcement for piracy and
infringement of properly Chinese registered copyrights.191 Yet this sort of international
suit will surely have little sway to prompt China to change its current enforcement
procedures, as Chinese nationals are not set to lose their international intellectual property
rights as a result of the complaint. The Beijing government’s likely response will be a
statement that it is attempting to restrict piracy and infringement together with an
announcement of token enforcement statistics; again, the actual enforcement will be left
to provincial governments which do little to protect foreign intellectual property rights.
China created an intellectual property rights regime to gain beneficial trade
relations, mostly in response to the demands of the United States’ and Europe’s. Western
countries sought protection of their own citizens’ intellectual property rights and, with
China’s economy booming, demanded China enact legislation that recognized these
rights, lest favorable trade relationships never materialize. The Chinese government saw
the need to assent to the various intellectual property agreements and conventions and
began to codify the provisions into Chinese Law beginning in the 1980s. But laws on the
books do not guarantee enforcement. For laws to be properly so-called, they must bear
the weight of authority and the fear of punishment; enforcement occurs only when either
a powerful government forces its will through the threat of considerable punishment or
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the citizens clamor for government imposition to protect their own interests. Intellectual
property rights enforcement in China’s adopted system is not a priority for the
government or the people. China’s businesses profit from piracy, with the infringingproducts market satisfying the consumer demands of the Chinese people. No moral
aversion to this piracy exists in China as individual property rights, tangible or not, have
little recognition. Even if there was hesitancy to pirate and infringe on other’s intellectual
property because of individual ownership, the concept of Li would overcome this
reticence—the individual should be subjugated to the good of the community.
China has little incentive to increase its intellectual property rights enforcement
procedures unless international influences cause Chinese business interests and the
population at large to desire further protection. The Beijing government currently gets to
have its cake and eat it too: Beijing can formally codify the provisions of international
treaties, thereby securing beneficial international trade relations, while the lack of
enforcement of these provisions enables local goods producers to infringe and expand the
Chinese economy. Until Chinese intellectual property laws reflect the mores and attitudes
of the population, any written or literary work, patented invention, or trade or service
mark, though formally protected, will not have any recognizable property value. There
may be internationally-appropriated intellectual property law but there is no enforcement.
Adequate enforcement of intellectual property laws in China will only occur when a shift
occurs in cultural and political thinking. If and when individual ownership rights are
embraced and the Chinese population recognizes a need for domestic intellectual property
rights protection, then China will have the internal motivation to enforce recognized
intellectual property rights. Until this internal motivation occurs, Chinese intellectual
property laws will be highly ineffectual to the international community.
Through the rampant piracy and infringement still occur in China, there are
indications that such the shift in motivation may be occurring. Domestic enterprises are
beginning to recognize the value of intellectual property rights. Between 1985 and 1992,
the 12,000 largest Chinese state-owned businesses each filed less than one patent
application each year on average.192 Initially, foreign companies filed most of the patent
applications under China’s new patent system. Increasingly, Chinese companies are not
only filing for Chinese patents, but also utilizing the Chinese patent and trademark laws
as a “legal means to resolve intellectual property disputes” instead of “simply infringing”
upon others’ rights.193 With the upcoming 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, the
Beijing government issued “special Protection of Olympic Symbols regulation” to
prevent losses from royalty revenues.194 It is more likely than not that these new grants,
judicial decisions, and enactments of positive law enforcement of intellectual property
rights will be better received and enforced as now Chinese, not Western, interests are
being protected. Steps toward better intellectual property rights protection may lead to a
changed understanding of individual ownership rights among Chinese businesses and the
Chinese population.
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Critiques of the Chinese intellectual property laws abound as modern world
governments and businesses desire instant gratification of their demands. It is obvious
from the Beijing government’s actions throughout the past twenty years that it wishes for
China to competitively participate in the global marketplace and to at least partially shed
its disconnected image. The question remains, at what cost? The Chinese intellectual
property system is changing from one that “effectively subsidiz[ed] piracy and taxe[d]
adherence to the law, to one which effectively subsidizes adherence to the law and taxes
piracy.”195 The Communist regime’s entry and participation in the capitalistic global
market can be likened to “riding a tiger;” capitalism a glorious and powerful beast, but
maintaining communist control or eventually dismounting may prove impossible.196 The
Beijing government’s idea to decentralize its enforcement of intellectual property laws
may have been a self-preservation tactic. At one time, domestic needs instigated the
development of the U.S. intellectual property system and its integration into the
international arena. The United States based its system of intellectual property rights on
an economic incentive to innovate following democratic-republican ideals. China, on the
other hand, is attempting to continue under a communist regime while joining a capitalist
system. While the national government may reluctantly consent to various capitalistic
requirements for the sake of progress, it allows the national Communist Party to influence
provincial officials to maintain communist ideals and actions. As the international
community endeavors for more effective intellectual property rights enforcement in
China, it is important to note that the democratic republic of the United States, though
idealistically opposed to the current Chinese regime, experienced the same selfish desires
to strengthen its own economy during the formation of its intellectual property rights
system. A country’s desire to encourage its own economy can turn the government from a
bootlegging pirate to an intellectual property protector.
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